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Abstract

governance duties. Some research efforts have been
done towards closing this gap by presenting
implementation guidelines.
One of the most frequently mentioned guidelines
is the implementation of an IT oversight (or similar)
committee at the level of the board [8, 17, 18, 21, 22,
26]. Yet, this recommendation does not seem to find
its way to practice [3, 7, 13]. Therefore, a clear
discrepancy exists between the recommendations
provided by academics and the current state of
practice. We found that even though IT oversight
committees are the most frequently mentioned IT
governance practice at the level of the board in
academic research, little is said about the role and the
workings of such a committee. That is, current
research remains quite superficial. With this paper,
we aim to contribute to the IT governance knowledge
base by providing an example of how an
organization, the University of Antwerp, has
implemented an IT oversight committee and how this
committee relates to the role of the board with regard
to IT governance. Hence, our study is guided by the
following two research questions:
RQ1: Which role(s) can an IT oversight (or
similar) committee at the level of the board of
directors assume?
RQ2: How can an IT oversight (or similar)
committee at the level of the board of directors be
organized?
The remainder of this proceedings paper is
structured as follows. First, a short description is
provided on board level IT governance as well as an
overview of the theories that are mentioned in the
relating literature. Next, a summary of the literature
on IT oversight (or similar) committees at the level of
the board is presented. Third, the case of the
University of Antwerp is described, shedding light on
the specifics of an IT oversight committee. The paper
ends with a discussion of what we can learn from the
University of Antwerp case, a conclusion and some

Researchers and practitioners seem to agree on
the importance of boards of directors engaging in IT
governance. Yet, only a minority of boards around
the globe are taking up accountability for governing
IT, pointing towards a knowing-doing gap. Efforts
have been made to close this gap by creating
implementation guidelines for this type of
engagement. One of the most frequently mentioned
guidelines is the implementation of an IT oversight or
similar committee at board level. However, research
shows that few boards have established such a
committee, which might be caused by the lack of
detailed guidance on the workings and role of such
committees. This paper discusses the case of the
University of Antwerp that has established two IT
oversight committees at board level. We demonstrate
how IT oversight committees can be established and
how they fit into the role of the board with regard to
IT governance.

1. Introduction
Organizations
are
becoming
increasingly
dependent on IT for both innovation and operations.
As a consequence, IT should become a part of
strategy and risk discussions. As the boards’
responsibilities entail both strategy and risk
management, we argue that boards can no longer
fully delegate IT-related strategic decision making
and control. Indeed, more and more research calls for
engagement of the board of directors in IT
governance [4, 13, 27]. At the same time, research
shows that few boards take up accountability for
governing IT [3, 4, 7, 28]. Hence, there seems to be a
knowing-doing gap, suggesting that boards are
struggling with the implementation of their IT
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limitations of this research and suggestions for future
research.

2. Board level IT governance
IT governance, otherwise referred to as
“enterprise governance of IT” or “corporate
governance of IT”, is “an integral part of corporate
governance, exercised by the Board, overseeing the
definition and implementation of processes,
structures and relational mechanisms in the
organization that enable both business and IT people
to execute their responsibilities in support of
business/IT alignment and the creation of business
value from IT-enabled investments” [10, 11]. This
definition explicitly positions IT governance as a
responsibility of the board of directors. This focus on
the role of the board in IT governance is relatively
new. Previously, IT governance research mainly
focused on the IT decision-making structures at
managerial-level and the contingencies that
determine the best way to implement IT governance
[6, 9, 30]. Recently, the role of the board in ITrelated strategic decision-making and control has
gained attention.
With regard to theoretical justification of IT
governance at the level of the board, agency theory is
the most widely used theoretical perspective [5, 16,
20, 31]. This agency theory approach implies a focus
on the control function of the board regarding IT.
Some researchers use the resource-based view of the
firm [26, 28] and the resource dependence theory [27,
31] as a perspective to examine board level IT
governance, considering boards and board members
as potentially valuable resources for governing IT.
Others suggest there is no one best way to implement
or shape board level IT governance, building on
contingency theory [4, 26, 27]. Similarly, Jewer and
McKay [13] combine institutional and strategic
choice theory to examine the antecedents and
consequences of board level IT governance. They
argue that the involvement of the board in IT
governance depends on institutional pressures that
influence the organization and the strategic choices
made by the board itself. Others build on stewardship
theory [26, 27], suggesting that managers are
trustworthy stewards of the organization and they are
in need of advice from the board of directors. Lastly,
stakeholder theory is mentioned in board level IT
governance research, implying that the board is
responsible for the oversight of the main IT resources
in support of all organization stakeholders [5]. These
different theoretical paradigms imply several board
roles regarding IT governance. That is, the board has
a control, service and resource dependence role with

regard to governing IT, as is proposed in corporate
governance literature [14]. Furthermore, the
engagement of the board in IT governance depends
on several factors, including institutional pressures
and board decisions.

3. IT oversight (or similar) committees at
the level of the board of directors
The most frequently mentioned approach to
increase board involvement in IT governance is the
establishment of an IT oversight or similar committee
at board level [8, 17, 18, 21, 22, 26]. Different
authors use different terms to refer to such a
committee; IT oversight committee [8, 17, 21], IT
governance committee [17, 18], IT steering
committee [22] and IT committee [26].
Various committee responsibilities are mentioned
in academic literature. Nolan and McFarlan [17]
argue that an IT oversight committee is responsible
for watching out for what competitors and other
organizations are doing with technology. On the
other hand, Oliver and Walker’s research [18]
addresses the topic of software development projects
and posits that the IT oversight committee is a body
responsible for governing: “expenditure and
realization of benefits of current and future IT
investments”, “standards, risk and compliance” and
“performance”. Posthumus, von Solms [21] argue
that the IT oversight committee should ensure that IT
is systematically added to the board’s agenda and that
it is addressed through a structured approach.
Moreover, it is the committee’s responsibility to
make sure that the board possesses all information
necessary for IT-related decision-making.
Despite the advice of these studies to establish a
board level IT oversight or similar committee,
research points out that the occurrence of these
committees in practice is rather low [3, 7, 13].
Figures ranging from 74.5% [3] to 91% [13] of
survey respondents that indicate not having such a
committee. On top of that, interviews with
practitioners show that some are not at all in favor of
introducing such a committee, because of time
constraints or because they do not believe that boards
have the appropriate expertise [3, 13]. Coertze and
Von Solms [7] warn for the pitfalls of establishing a
committee at board level. They emphasize that even
though a committee is established, the board still
remains accountable.
A contingency approach can be taken with regard
to the implementation of an IT oversight or similar
committee. Such a committee is not suited for every
type of organization. The need depends on the role of
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between the IT oversight committee and the audit
committee is key. This could be facilitated by
including the same person in both committees. [17]
The board level committee responsible for IT
governance should regularly report to the board of
directors. Posthumus, von Solms [21] specify the
frequency of this reporting. More specifically, in
organizations in support mode, the committee should
report to the board every 6 to 12 months, while the
factory mode requires a report every 3 to 6 months.
The IT oversight or similar committee in
organizations in an offensive mode should report to
the board every 3 months. An overview of the
research on IT oversight or similar committees can be
found in Table 1.

Committee

Strategic Impact
Grid Mode

Table 1 Overview IT oversight or similar
committee

Frequency
of reports

IT in the organization [8, 17, 21]. An important
framework that can be used to describe the role of IT
in the organization is the strategic impact grid
developed by Nolan and McFarlan [17]. They posit
that organizations can either have a defensive IT
strategy, which focuses on operational reliability,
ensuring smoothly running, secure, cost-effective IT
systems or an offensive IT strategy, which considers
IT as a strategic asset, enabling the organization to
offer new products and services or to be more
responsive to customer needs. Accordingly, the
strategic impact grid which identifies four “IT use
modes” based on the organization’s need for reliable
IT and it’s need for new IT. Organizations in support
mode only need technology to support employee’s
activities. Factory mode organizations require highly
reliable IT, but have a low need for new IT. When the
need for new IT is high, but the organization does not
rely on IT for the continuity of the business,
turnaround mode applies. Organizations with a high
need for both reliable and new IT are situated in the
strategic mode.
A similar perspective is used by Coertze and von
Solms [8], who build on this notion of defensive and
offensive IT strategy. They propose the idea of an IT
alignment continuum that includes the organization’s
IT dependency ranging from a defensive stance,
where IT supports the business, to an offensive
stance, where IT is the business. These researchers
agree that in case of an offensive IT strategy or
stance, a separate IT oversight or similar committee
is required. The audit or risk management committee
can take up the board level IT governance
responsibilities in organizations with a defensive IT
strategy or stance [17, 21]. The IT expertise within
the board is also a determining factor for the need of
an IT oversight committee. Boards with a limited
level of IT expertise might benefit more from
establishing such a committee [8].
In case an organization chooses to implement an
IT oversight or similar committee, “the appropriate
members and the chairman should be selected, the
group’s relationship to the audit committee should be
determined and the charter should be prepared”.
Similar to other board level committees, like an audit
or compensation committee, independent directors
are considered to be appropriate members. As the
committee’s focus is on IT, it should include at least
one IT expert with profound knowledge of the
business needs. The selection of the chairman
depends on the role of IT in the organization. In case
of support, factory or turnaround mode, the chairman
should be an IT-savvy business executive.
Organizations in strategic mode should appoint an IT
expert as chair. Furthermore, a close relationship

Defensive

Support

Offensive

Factory

Turnaround Strategic

Audit or risk Audit or risk IT
management management oversight
committee
committee
committee

IT
oversight
committee

Every 6-12
months

Every 3
months

Every 3-6
months

Every 3
months

4. Research approach
This paper describes the case of board level IT
governance at the university of Antwerp. Case
research perfectly fits our goal, as it is particularly
relevant when the research question that is put
forward seeks to explain how a social phenomenon
works and requires an extensive and “in-depth”
description of this phenomenon [32]. In order to truly
understand the reason for the establishment of IT
governance practices at the level of the board of
directors and how these practices work at the
University of Antwerp, multiple data sources were
combined. Five stakeholders were interviewed using
a semi-structured interview protocol: the rector, the
chair of the board of administration, the two heads of
the IT department and the head of the department of
research and innovation. These stakeholders were
actively involved in the establishment of the new IT
governance practices. The interviews were conducted
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in February, March and April of 2017 at the
University of Antwerp. The interviews were recorded
and transcribed to facilitate their processing. In
addition, documents such as the meeting minutes of
the board and the IT governance committee were
examined.

5. The case of the University of Antwerp
In this section, the case of the University of
Antwerp will be described. First, an introduction on
the university and its top-level entities is provided.
Second, the board level IT governance initiatives at
the university are presented.

5.1. Introduction to the case
The University of Antwerp is a relatively young
university, founded in 2003, fusing three separate
university institutions that date back to 1965.
Currently the university is responsible for the
education of 20,367 students of 116 nationalities. The
university staff consists of 5,398 people, including
professors, assistants, researchers, education staff and
administrative and technical staff. Its three core tasks
are research, education and services.
The central governance structure at the University
of Antwerp consists of the rector, 3 central governing
bodies and 9 central advisory bodies. The rector is
the university’s highest academic official. He is
appointed for a four-year term by the board of
directors after university-wide elections. The central
governing bodies include the board of directors, the
executive board and the board of administration,
which is responsible for the daily management of the
university. These governing bodies are supported by
the central advisory bodies, including the education
board, the research board and the academic council
for service to society.
The IT department of the University of Antwerp
maintains, manages and develops the IT
infrastructure at the university. They provide
solutions to support the three core tasks of the
university: research, education and services, but also
facilitate secondary processes such as administration
and management. In addition, they provide direct
support to end users and attend to the maintenance of
the infrastructure.

5.2. Board level IT governance at the
University of Antwerp

Like many organizations, the University of
Antwerp has become increasingly dependent on IT.
This increasing dependence on IT also entails a
growing number of IT enabled investments that need
to be carried out by the IT department. The IT
department began to struggle with this great number
of IT enabled investments. No central business forum
existed to decide which projects would be executed
and which would not, swamping the IT department
with many requests they could not deliver against.
This situation often led to frustration on the business
side, a tension which was also reported to and known
by some board members.
Furthermore, in 2016, a new rector came at the
head of the University of Antwerp. The newly
appointed rector strongly believes that the
organization should think about long term
developments and how the university can adapt to
these developments. More specifically, he stated that
he thinks it is the task of the board of directors to
create this long term vision, also regarding IT-related
issues.
Accordingly, the University of Antwerp decided
to tackle the need to (1) establish a more formal IT
portfolio management process that includes all
relevant stakeholders, (2) increase the involvement of
the board in this process and (3) ensure a more
forward-looking approach.
A widely acknowledged strategy to increase and
improve the involvement of the board in IT-related
decision making and control, is to enhance its IT
expertise [13, 19, 29]. However, due to the nature of
the board of directors at the university, there are not
many options to thoughtfully alter its composition.
When the University of Antwerp initiated more board
level engagement in digital strategy and oversight,
only 6 of the 25 members of the board were external
directors. The internal directors were appointed after
elections among the different university entities and
students. From the 6 external members, the university
could merely appoint 3. The others were selected by
the minister for education, the governor of the
province of Antwerp and the provincial superior of
the society of Jesus, which made it difficult to
increase the level of IT expertise among board
members. Since September 1st 2017, the board is
allowed to appoint 3 additional directors. This change
will provide the university with the opportunity to
slightly alter the composition of the board. As the 3
additional members have not been appointed yet at
the time of writing, the future will show whether this
new arrangement will result in a higher level of IT
expertise at the board of directors.
Due to the limited level of IT expertise on the
board, it makes sense to make sure this IT expertise is
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present and IT-related debates are held in other
structures that report to or advise the board.
Accordingly, committees were created that include
board members and that assist the board in IT-related
decision making and control. Indeed, the creation of
an IT oversight or similar committee at board level is
a frequently mentioned approach in academic
literature to increase board involvement in IT
governance [8, 17, 26]. At the university, two such
committees were created. One committee, the IT
governance committee, considers rather short term
decisions and is in charge of portfolio management of
IT enabled investments. This committee is supported
by the investment office. The other committee, the
digital strategy think tank, considers the long term
from more an outside-in perspective. The committees
are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1 IT oversight committees at the
University of Antwerp
5.2.1. Guiding principles. When the University of
Antwerp decided to act on the growing need for IT
governance mechanisms, a set of guiding principles
was agreed upon. These principles include:
1. Transparency regarding investment criteria:
the evaluation of proposed investments should be
handled in a transparent way. Clear criteria should
be created to decide whether or not to start an
investment.
2. Transparency regarding the investment
budget: the size of the investment budget should
be known at all times.
3. Transparency
regarding
individual
investments: for every investment a business case
needs to be developed according to a standard
form. Moreover, a business owner is appointed to
each investment and no investments can be
launched without a business owner.
4. Transparency regarding the investment
portfolio: all investments need to go through the
same portfolio decision cycle so that a full and
transparent view can be obtained.
These guiding principles were used as a basis to
create the board level IT governance structures that
are described in the following sections.

5.2.2. IT governance committee. The IT governance
committee was established in 2015 and meets 3 times
a year. The main goal of this committee is to manage
the IT enabled investment portfolio more effectively
and transparently and make sure it is in line with the
overall organization strategy. From a board’s
perspective, the committee should provide reasonable
assurance that the university’s IT enabled
investments are in line with the university strategy.
Indeed, up until now, the main topic of the committee
meetings has been which investments to execute.
However, the interviewees indicated that in the
future, other topics like project benefits delivery and
the IT policy plan could be part of this meeting.
Not all IT enabled investments pass by the IT
governance
committee.
Rather
operational
investments – like the renewal of certain academic
software licenses – are not discussed at this level of
the organization, as these would overburden this
forum. Instead, the committee focuses on more
strategic and innovative projects, which cover about
45% of the entire IT budget.
Due to the democratic nature of the decision
making culture at the university, it is crucial to
include a broad delegation of people of the university
in this committee. Hence, the goal was to create an
entity that would represent all university entities as
good as possible. The result is a committee that
consists of 15 voting members and 30 advisory
members. In addition, the chairman and vicechairman can invite internal or external experts that
act as advisors. The rector is appointed chairman, the
chair of the board of administration is the vicechairman. The 15 voting members are the rector, 2
members of the Board of Administration, the 4 vicerectors, 3 members of the board of directors, 3
members appointed by the Council of Deans and the
2 heads of the IT department.
The composition reveals that the board is actively
engaged in the IT debate. Four directors were
appointed voting members of the IT governance
committee (including the rector) and all other
directors are also welcome to join. Indeed, at the past
committee meetings, attendance ranged from 4 up to
8 directors.
As the heads of the IT department are included in
the committee, a certain level of IT expertise is
present. However, the goal of the committee is not to
go too much into the technical details, but to discuss
the investments from a business perspective. Indeed,
one of the heads of the IT departments states:
“Within the IT governance committee we present the
projects as understandable and as little technical as
possible. This is also explicitly mentioned in the IT
governance committee charter.” Of course, the
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details must be considered at one point. Therefore, it
was decided to establish an additional preparatory
committee; the investment office.
The investment office is responsible for preparing
investments to be presented to the IT governance
committee. More specifically, a scoring model, which
is approved by the IT governance committee, is used
to evaluate the fit with the organization strategy, the
risks and the expenditure. This scoring model enables
a fairly objective quotation of the investment.
Investments are evaluated from a business as well as
a technical perspective. For example, the match with
the three core tasks of the university (education,
research and services) is assessed. An overview of all
the scoring criteria is shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Scoring model
Criterion
Strategic match domain education
Strategic match domain research
Strategic match domain services
Business
Administrative streamlining
domain
Management information
Marketing / image
Strategic match ICT policy plan
Strategic IS architecture
Technology Definitional uncertainty
domain
Technical uncertainty
IS infrastructure risk
Domain

For each of these criteria, underlying questions
were developed that allow to come to a “green”,
“yellow” or “red” score in a consistent way. Green
represents a good match, yellow exemplifies a
limited match and red suggests there is no match. In
case the investment criterion is not applicable (e.g. an
investment in a new online platform for research is
not relevant for the education strategy) a “grey” score
is used. At the end of this exercise, a scorecard is
created, showing the benefits, risks and expenditure
of each investment. The scores are presented using
colors, as this enables the reader to evaluate the
investment’s strengths and weaknesses at a glance.
The investment office does not make any
investment decisions but can conclude that a
proposed investment is not yet fully defined and
matured in the current business case document. As
this is merely a supporting committee with a more indepth focus, it does not reside at the level of the
board. The actual decision on whether or not to go
through with an investment is made in the IT
governance committee. However, the score
determined by the investment office is crucial to
make this decision. This is reflected in the IT

governance committee agenda, which always
includes the topics as shown in Table 3.
Every meeting, an overview of the IT budget is
provided, which is in line with the guiding principles
regarding transparency that were established at the
beginning of this venture. Furthermore, all
investments in need of a go/no-go decision are
discussed. First, the investment business case and the
color code that is determined by the investment office
are presented. Then, the committee discusses the
investment. Lastly, it is decided whether or not the
investment will be executed.
Table 3 IT governance committee agenda main topics
IT governance committee agenda
Budget overview
Investments:
 Investment business case
 Color code resulting from scoring model
 Discussion
 Decision
5.2.3. Digital strategy think tank. The other IT
governance structure at the top-level of the university
is the digital strategy think tank. The current rector
started his term in 2016. From the beginning of his
mandate, he stated he wants “an organization that is
agile and thinks about future needs” and in support
of that, he wants to free up the time of the board to
execute this task. He argues that “IT is no longer a
supporting frame, it is much more than that. We are
at the beginning of an evolution and do not even
realize what is in front of us. We need to think about
the university in 20 years, IT in 20 years and the
society in 20 years.”
In light of these developments, he initiated the
creation of the digital strategy think tank which meets
several times a year (the meeting frequency is
currently undefined, in 2017 four meetings took
place).
The goal of this committee is to consider long
term developments that could influence the
university. They consider both how emerging
technologies can impact the university’s business
model and strategy, as well as how challenges in
society and markets could be addressed levering new
technological innovations. One of the topics
discussed was the fact that at a certain point in the
future, more people will retire than enter the job
market, which might trigger companies to hire
students before they have finished their masters. This
development could affect the university, as it might
require students to obtain their master’s degree in a
more flexible way, for example supported by e-
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learning. These kind of digital strategy discussions
require a certain level of IT expertise, which is
reflected in the composition of the committee. The
members of the digital strategy think tank are the
rector, the chair of the Board of Administration, 3
professors with IT expertise, a board member with IT
expertise and 4 members of the IT department.
Similar to the IT governance committee, the
board of directors is represented in the think tank; the
rector and one other board member are included. The
difference is that for the digital strategy think tank,
they specifically opted to include a board member
with IT expertise.
Table 4 provides an overview of the two IT
oversight committees at the University of Antwerp,
their goal and members.
Table 4 Overview IT oversight committees at
the University of Antwerp
Committee
IT
governance
committee

Goal
Manage IT
enabled
investment
portfolio more
effectively and
transparently and
align it with
overall
organization
strategy.

Digital
strategy
think tank

Keep an eye on
the impact of
technological
developments on
the university and
consider how
societal and
market challenges
could be addressed
leveraging
technology.

Members
 Rector
 2 Members of the
Board of
Administration
 The 4 vice-rectors
 3 Members of the
board of directors
 3 Members
appointed by the
Council of Deans
 2 Heads of the IT
department
 Rector
 Chair
of
the
Board
of
Administration
 3 professors with
IT expertise
 A board member
with IT expertise
 4 members of the
IT department

6. Discussion
This study on the board level IT governance
committees at the University of Antwerp provides
some unique insights with regard to the two research
questions that contribute to the body of knowledge of
board level IT governance research which are
presented in this section.
No consensus seems to exist on the role of an IT
oversight committee at the level of the board of
directors. The roles described in literature are (1)
monitoring of competitors and other organizations

with regard to their IT-related activities [17], (2)
monitoring of IT project costs and benefits, risk and
compliance and value delivery [18], (3) ensuring IT
is a topic on the board agenda and (4) ensuring
boards have the necessary information for IT
decision-making [21]. The case of the University of
Antwerp indicates that the role of the committee
strongly depends on the needs of the organization.
This is in line with the guidance provided in
literature, which incorporates a contingency
approach. Yet, current research focusses on the
contingency factors that determine whether or not an
organization should install an IT oversight or similar
committee. Yet, this case study suggests that a
contingency approach can also be taken towards the
role of such a committee. At the University of
Antwerp, the role of the IT governance committee
corresponds to the role described by Oliver and
Walker [18]. That is, this committee is mainly
responsible for the evaluation of the business cases of
IT-related projects. Yet, the role of the digital
strategy think tank is different from the roles
described in academic literature. This committee’s
responsibility is to keep an eye on the impact of
technological developments on the university and
consider how societal and market challenges could be
addressed leveraging technology. Hence, it seems
that the list of roles described in literature is not
exhaustive. Thus, defining the possible roles of IT
oversight committees is an interesting topic for future
research.
As previously mentioned, various theoretical
perspectives are applied to examine board level IT
governance, implying different board roles: control,
service and resource dependence. This case study
also demonstrates how the board of directors could
execute these roles through IT oversight committees.
The control role of the board with regard to IT
governance, based on agency theory, entails that the
board should monitor the IT-related actions and
decisions of management [20, 25]. In order to
adequately perform this control role, board members
should have the right competencies to challenge the
responses of management, which is often not the case
[20, 25, 29, 31]. Moreover, the information
asymmetry between the board and management
should be reduced to a minimum [31]. At the
University of Antwerp, the control role is mainly
assigned to the IT governance committee. The
problems of limited IT-related knowledge and
information asymmetry are coped with through the
support of the investment office. The investment
office ensures that the necessary information reaches
the IT governance committee. On top of that, they
prepare decisions by evaluating investments using a
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scoring model, which was approved by the IT
governance committee. IT expertise is necessary to
fill in this scoring model, but not to use the results.
That way, the IT governance committee can
adequately perform its control role, regardless of its
limited IT expertise.
Stewardship theory implies that the board also has
a service role, which entails duties like advising
management on matters such as IT strategy, helping
them fund strategic opportunities and responding to
management requests [26, 27]. In the case of the
university, the digital strategy think tank is entirely
focused on this board responsibility. More
specifically, this committee provides guidance to
management on IT strategic opportunities and
challenges.
Various authors have presented the resourcebased view of the firm and the resource dependence
theory as perspectives to examine board level IT
governance [26, 28, 31], suggesting that board
members can be valuable resources for the
governance of IT. This case study demonstrates this
board member value and the potential role of a
committee to unfold or even maximize it. Due to the
nature of the selection process of board members at
the university of Antwerp, it is very difficult to
deliberately balance the expertise within the board.
Yet, the university was able to select one nonexecutive director with significant IT expertise. The
impact of this one director has increased considerably
with the creation of the digital strategy think tank.
This smaller committee offers a perfect platform for
this director to have a substantial impact and deliver
value by adding an outside perspective and
significant IT expertise. Because of this platform that
was designed to hold discussions regarding long term
IT developments, the value that this IT savvy director
can deliver is maximized.
This study also provides some insights on
possible IT oversight committee arrangements.
Current research suggests the establishment of one IT
oversight (or similar) committee, in some cases
supported by the audit or risk committee.
Nevertheless, the university decided to create two IT
oversight committees at the level of the board.
Although this is in conflict with existing guidance, it
is an interesting approach as it allows the
organization
to
clearly
separate
different
responsibilities and adapt committee membership
accordingly. In this specific case, the responsibilities
of portfolio management on the one hand and a
ensuring forward-looking, outside-in approach on the
other hand are divided over two committees. For the
former, the efficient management of the IT-enabled
investment portfolio, the university needed

representatives of both business and IT. Furthermore,
it was crucial to include a broad delegation of
members, covering a wide range of university
entities. However, the membership needs of the
digital strategy think tank are entirely different. Here,
a certain level of IT expertise is crucial as well as the
competence to think about long term strategies. That
is why for instance a non-executive director with
significant IT expertise is included. Moreover, the
type of discussions held at this committee requires a
smaller amount of members.

7. Limitations and future research
Several limitations should be acknowledged.
First, a single case study is described. It might be
interesting to be able to examine multiple
organizations and compare various IT oversight
committee arrangements. However, a single case
enabled us to describe the context and features of the
IT oversight committees at the university in detail.
Second, the University of Antwerp is still at the
beginning of its board level IT governance journey.
Future research should also include studies of
organizations with more mature board level IT
governance arrangements.
This case study provides various new insights on
IT oversight committees at the level of the board that
could spark additional research. First, the summary of
existing literature on this topic reveals that different
roles of IT oversight committees are described by
different authors. In addition, this case study suggests
an additional role that was not yet mentioned in
academic literature. Defining the various roles a
committee could take up might enable us to create a
better understanding of how such a committee could
be a valuable asset and, as a consequence, stimulate
board members to establish this kind of structure.
Second, we provide an example of how a board
level committee, in this case the IT governance
committee, is supported by a committee at another
level in the organization, i.e. the investment office.
The cooperation of committees at different levels in
the organization deserves more attention. More
broadly speaking, the dynamics between governance
mechanisms at the level of the board and at lower
levels is a crucial research topic. Indeed, a holistic
approach towards IT governance is essential [11].
Furthermore, the dynamics between executive
management and the board of directors has been a
well-researched topic within corporate governance
research [1, 2, 23, 24]. Similarly, we should not
consider board IT governance mechanisms in a
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vacuum, but examine their relationship to the
governance system in the rest of the organization.
Third, this case study suggests that the modus
operandi of an IT oversight committee highly
depends on the role it assumes. Consequently, future
research should examine different committee
arrangements and how they relate to the committee
role.
Fourth, in this research we examine how boards
of directors can operationalize their IT governance
duties, but what about reporting on this topic? As
research indicates that board level IT governance
leads to increased organizational performance [13,
26] and theories such as voluntary disclosure theory
and agency theory predict that firms can improve
their liquidity and firm valuation through better
information intermediation [12], organizations could
benefit from IT governance disclosure [15]. As a
consequence, how boards report on their involvement
in IT governance could be an interesting topic for
future research.

8. Conclusion
The goal of this research was to open up the black
box of IT oversight (or similar) committees at the
level of the board of directors. More specifically, we
used a case study to provide insights on the role and
modus operandi of such committees. We concluded
that an IT oversight committee can take up various
roles, depending on the organization’s needs.
Furthermore, the board can execute its control,
service and resource dependence roles through such a
committee. The case study also provided inspiration
with regard to the workings of an IT oversight
committee. That is, the board can establish multiple
committees in order to separate responsibilities.
Clearly, membership should be adapted according to
the responsibilities the committee assumes.
With this research, we contribute to the IT
governance knowledge base in several ways. First,
we found that both researchers and practitioners
agree that boards of directors can no longer delegate
their IT governance related responsibilities, yet, few
boards engage in governing IT. We contribute to
closing this knowing doing gap by focusing on the
most frequently mentioned guideline in academic
research.
Second, none of the existing research on board
level IT governance reports on governance practices
observed in a specific organization in detail. Instead,
descriptive research regarding this topic currently
includes reports of large data sets containing
information on the mechanisms deployed and

perceptions of board members resulting from surveys
and interview with individual board members. With
regard to research on IT oversight committees at the
level of the board, we found only few studies that
report on the current state of practice. These studies
simply report on the presence of an IT oversight
committee and provide some quotes of board
members expressing their opinion on the need for
such a committee [7, 13, 17]. Hence, this is the first
in-depth study on IT oversight committees, providing
the details and context of this governance mechanism
in a specific organization.
Third, because we are the first to take an in-depth
look at IT oversight committees, many new and
interesting paths for future research surface.
We contribute to practice by inspiring boards and
board members who are attempting to increase their
engagement in IT governance. Especially those
boards with a limited amount of IT expertise. While
enhancing the IT expertise within the board is a
popular, and probably the most obvious, strategy to
increase and improve the involvement of the board in
IT governance, it can be very difficult. An alternative
way to get started is creating an IT oversight
committee, involving people with IT expertise from
different layers of the organization. Moreover, an IT
oversight committee ensures the involvement of the
board in the IT debate. We provide boards with clear
and applicable guidance on the possible organization
and role of such an IT oversight committee.
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